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Pete Mandik 
Meta-Illusionism 
and Qualia Quietism 
Abstract: Many so-called problems in contemporary philosophy of 
mind depend for their expression on a collection of inter-defined 
technical terms, a few of which are qualia, phenomenal property, and 
what-it’s-like-ness. I express my scepticism about Keith Frankish’s 
illusionism, the view that people are generally subject to a systematic 
illusion that any properties are phenomenal, and scout the relative 
merits of two alternatives to Frankish’s illusionism. The first is 
phenomenal meta-illusionism, the view that illusionists such as 
Frankish, in holding their view, are themselves thereby under an 
illusion. The second is qualia quietism, the view that nothing worth 
saying is said by employing any of the aforementioned inter-defined 
technical terms. 
I am strongly sympathetic with Frankish’s illusionism, and if he were 
right to suggest that the only real options regarding so-called phenom-
enal consciousness were radical realism about phenomenal properties 
and his illusionism, I would readily ally with the latter. However, I 
don’t view those two as the only appealing choices, and I don’t think 
the other views Frankish mentions prior to narrowing the field — e.g. 
conservative realism, eliminativism — adequately describe my own 
favoured approach to the topic. 
Taking inspiration from Rey’s (2007) meta-atheism, which, instead 
of the view that God does not exist, is the view that no one actually 
believes that God exists (despite their claims to the contrary), I am 
tempted to label my reaction to Frankish’s illusionism, meta-
illusionism. The gist of meta-illusionism is that it rejects phenomenal 
realism while also insisting that no one is actually under the illusion 
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that there are so-called phenomenal properties. One line of thought 
that leads me to meta-illusionism is that there’s no content to the claim 
that any properties seem ‘phenomenal’ to anybody. And here my 
worries are almost entirely about the word ‘phenomenal’ and its ilk. 
Another line of thought that leads me to meta-illusionism hinges on 
the word ‘illusion’ and the worry that, while there may be some 
people to whom it seems that there are phenomenal properties, this 
appearance, which I do not grant as reflecting reality, is insufficiently 
widespread to be worth considering an illusion (as opposed to, say, a 
weird belief that certain philosophically educated individuals claim to 
hold). Given my worries about what counts as an illusion properly so-
called, I am a little reluctant to embrace the label ‘meta-illusionism’ 
since I don’t want to say that the illusionists are deceived in a 
sufficiently systematic way to attribute to them an illusion. If I needed 
a better label for my view, I might go with ‘qualia quietism’, and I’ll 
close the current article with remarks about what that amounts to. 
1. On ‘phenomenal’ 
One thing Frankish and I have in common is that neither of us wants 
to assert that there are any properties instantiated that are referred to or 
picked out by the phrase ‘phenomenal properties’. One place where 
Frankish and I part ways is over whether that phrase is sufficiently 
meaningful for there to be a worthwhile research programme investi-
gating how it comes to seem to people that their experiences 
instantiate any such properties. Like Frankish, I’m happy with terms 
like ‘experience’, ‘consciousness’, and ‘conscious experience’ and 
join Frankish in using what he calls ‘weak’ and functional construals 
of such terms. But, unlike Frankish, I see no use at all, not even an 
illusionist one, for the term ‘phenomenal’ and its ilk. 
The term ‘phenomenal’, as used in contemporary philosophy of 
mind, is a technical term. I am aware of no non-technical English 
word or phrase that is accepted as its direct analogue. Unlike technical 
terms in maths and physics, which are introduced with explicit defi-
nitions, ‘phenomenal’ has no such definition. What we find instead of 
an explicit definition are other technical terms treated as interchange-
able synonyms. Frankish follows common practice in philosophy of 
mind when he treats ‘phenomenal’ as interchangeable with, for 
instance, ‘qualitative’ or, in scare-quotes, ‘“feely”’. 
As used in the relevant philosophy-of-mind contexts, ‘qualitative’ 
doesn’t mean simply ‘relating to qualities’, since properties and 
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qualities are one and the same, and the technical term is supposed to 
pick out some special kind of property, a property distinctive of 
conscious experiences. The technical term ‘qualitative’ also does not 
seem to mean ‘characterizing in ways other than quantity’, which, if it 
did, would at least have the virtue of relating it to a non-technical use, 
but would lose its claim to pick out something specific to conscious 
experience. 
Trouble arises for “feely”, which, as the scare quotes seem to warn, 
is not to be equated with non-technical uses of ‘feel’ and its cognates, 
which pertain to feeling temperatures and textures, but decidedly not 
to, for example, what differentiates seeing blue from seeing green. 
These three terms — ‘phenomenal’, ‘qualitative’, and ‘“feely”’ — 
form a tight circle conveying little to no information to the meta-
illusionist demanding to know what it is that the illusionist thinks 
people are under the illusion of. 
One phrase that might seem to break us out of the circle of technical 
terms is the phrase ‘something it’s like’, for there are non-technical 
uses of ‘what it’s like’ (Farrell, 2016), and phenomenal properties are 
supposed to be those properties in virtue of which there is something 
it’s like to have experiences. However, to my knowledge, the syntactic 
transformation from ‘what it’s like’ to ‘there is something it’s like’ 
occurs only in technical philosophy-of-mind contexts. This makes me 
doubt that non-technical uses of ‘what it’s like’, which sometimes (but 
not always) are employed to pick out mental states, are employed to 
pick out a peculiar kind of property of mental states. When, for 
example, pop stars sing about knowing what it’s like to fall in love, 
they give little evidence of attributing so-called ‘phenomenal’ 
properties, as opposed to whatever other properties a meta-illusionist 
can readily grant are seemingly instantiated by love states. The 
hyphenated ‘what-it’s-like’ in Frankish’s ‘“what-it’s-like” properties’ 
(Frankish, this issue, p. 15) is yet another technical term shedding no 
light on the term ‘phenomenal’. 
We have then, in place of an explicit definition of ‘phenomenal 
properties’, a circular chain of interchangeable technical terms — a 
chain with very few links, and little to relate those links to non-
technical terminology. The circle, then, is vicious. I’m sceptical that 
any properties seem ‘phenomenal’ to anyone because this vicious 
circle gives me very little idea what seeming ‘phenomenal’ would be. 
One way out of the vicious circle that seems unavailable to Frankish 
is a kind of deferential ostension. Radical realists can, without pangs 
of conscience, attempt to convey what they’re talking about by 
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inviting an act of inner ostension: they invite us to look inward and 
appreciate that they are talking about properties like that. Since they 
think there are such properties, they aren’t failing by their own lights 
to specify what they are talking about. They may nonetheless be 
failing, and their ‘that’ refers to nothing, but they would not be failing 
by their own lights. Illusionists, in contrast, are in a worse position, 
since by their own lights there are no such instantiated properties to 
inwardly point at. Since they hold instantiated phenomenal properties 
to be merely notional, they may attempt to gesture toward what they 
would be if there were any by some indirect route, perhaps via the 
description, ‘whatever it is that radical realists are talking about’. 
However, the very real possibility arises that the radical realists aren’t 
all talking about the same thing, given the lack of any explicit 
definition of ‘phenomenal property’ that they agree on. Echoing 
Wittgenstein (1953), each radical realist labels the private contents of 
their beetle-box ‘a beetle’, but, for all anyone knows, each box may 
contain something different from the others, or even nothing at all. 
The problem I pose for Frankish is a problem of content, but it is not 
the problem of content that he himself addresses in Section 3.4 of the 
target article. There he considers the problem of what would fix the 
content of the introspective representations of phenomenal properties 
given that there aren’t any phenomenal properties instantiated. He 
appreciates that the illusionist will not be able to employ any psycho-
semantics that relies on positing relations, causal or other, between 
representations and actually instantiated properties accurately repre-
sented. The challenge I pose for Frankish is not the challenge of 
giving an account of how such representations get their content. The 
challenge I pose is instead to articulate what the content is. The con-
trast between the two challenges might be illustrated via the following 
analogy: the theory-of-content challenge is to explain how a repre-
sentation of cows comes to be a representation of cows and not of 
horses and not of the disjunction cow-or-horse, and so on. My 
challenge — the articulation challenge — is to say what some target 
representation represents, to say that it represents cows, or instead 
represents horses, or some disjunction, and so on. I want to ask of the 
representations that Frankish alleges to be illusory: what are they 
representations of? The technical-term circle — phenomenal property, 
qualitative property, ‘feely’ property, ‘what-it’s-like’ property, quale 
— does nothing to answer the question. Maybe a radical realist may 
feel confident that the terms in the circle are informative, picking out, 
as they allege, some inner ostended property — but how can one 
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sympathetic to either illusionism or meta-illusionism gain any satis-
faction here? 
2. Regarding illusions 
So far, I have been focusing on a circle of technical synonyms for the 
technical term ‘phenomenal property’. To be fair, Frankish does give 
other characterizations of phenomenal properties, characterizations 
that might break us out of the circle described above. However, these 
other characterizations introduce other problems for Frankish’s 
illusionism. 
Frankish sometimes characterizes phenomenal properties as anoma-
lous (p. 13) and other times as magical (p. 28). There are other 
characterizations that come up as well in Frankish’s article (e.g. 
‘simple’, ‘intrinsic’), but I will focus on just on ‘magical’ and ‘anoma-
lous’ for simplicity’s sake. What these characterizations (including 
characterizations besides ‘magical’ and ‘anomalous’) have in common 
is that they (1) give some hope of, at least partially, breaking out of 
the circle of technical terms I complain about in the previous section, 
(2) they characterize properties in such a way that motivates illusion-
ism along the lines spelled out in Section 2.3 of the target article, but 
(3) as I’ll argue below, problems arise for the claim that the false 
appearances in question are illusions properly so-called. 
Perhaps Frankish is not employing technical senses of either 
‘anomalous’ or ‘magical’, so there’s hope here of breaking out of the 
vicious circle of technical synonyms, and to give an informative, 
though perhaps partial, answer to the question of what so-called 
phenomenal representations are representations of. On the partial 
account now being scouted, they would be, if actually instantiated, 
properties of experiences that are anomalous or magical. The worry I 
want to raise now is whether it seems to people in a sufficiently 
systematic way that their experiences have anomalous or magical 
properties. If it only seems this way to a few people, people versed in 
certain moves internal to the philosophy of mind, then this erroneous 
appearance seems ill-described as an illusion. 
Illusions properly so-called occur in systematic ways for large 
numbers of the population. For example, it is very easy to find people 
prone to the visual illusion of Müller-Lyer. For many people, certain 
line pairs seem of unequal length when in reality they are equal. 
Switching examples: people exposed to the Monty Hall problem give 
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the wrong answer with such high frequency that it’s worth, perhaps, 
calling it a cognitive illusion.1 
To be clear, I am not claiming that in order for something to be an 
illusion properly so-called, a large number of people have to actually 
have undergone the illusion. Suppose very few people have seen the 
Müller-Lyer figures or have been exposed to the Monty Hall problem. 
Nonetheless, in these cases, there is an easily conveyed stimulus or 
scenario that, when presented to people, readily elicits a false appear-
ance in many of those so-presented. There’s something systematic to 
these false appearances that makes them illusions as opposed to mere 
false appearances. Examples of false appearances that lack this 
requisite systematicity include many examples of run-of-the-mill false 
belief. Last Wednesday, George believed his keys were in his brief-
case when in reality he had left them on his desk. In some sense of 
appear, it appeared to George that his keys were in his briefcase. But 
his false representation of the keys’ whereabouts is not part of a larger 
pattern of eliciting conditions and responses that make it rise to the 
level of illusion. The example of George’s false belief is one that 
involves only a single person. However, being held by many people is 
not a sufficient condition for a false representation to be an illusion. 
Many people have held, erroneously, that 1 is a prime number and that 
Christopher Columbus was the first European to arrive in the 
Americas. But these false representations aren’t illusions either. There 
isn’t, in these cases, an easily conveyed scenario or stimulus that 
reliably elicits a false appearance. 
Let us temporarily leave aside the topic of whether conscious 
experiences seem to have anomalous or magical properties, and ask 
about apparent anomalousness or apparent magicalness more 
generally. Perhaps if we have a better handle on what such appear-
ances are generally, we may find ourselves in a better position to 
                                                          
1  The Monty Hall problem involves a game show scenario in which there are three closed 
doors, behind two of which are goats, and one of which is a car. The contestant makes 
an initial selection of a door, but before that door is opened, one of the other doors is 
opened by the game show host to reveal a goat. The contestant is now offered a choice: 
to stick with their initial section, or to switch to the other unopened door. The central 
question of the Monty Hall problem is whether there’s any advantage (assuming one 
prefers cars to goats!) to switching. The common, and wrong, answer is that there is no 
advantage, on the erroneous grounds that there’s a 1-in-2 probability of the car being 
behind the initially selected door. The correct response, unintuitive to many people, is 
that accepting the offer to switch doors raises one’s chances of getting the car from 1-in-
3 to 2-in-3. 
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assess the claim that conscious experiences systematically appear to 
have anomalous or magical properties. 
Consider some impressive display performed by a professional 
magician. Suppose a ball is presented on a table’s surface, and then 
seemingly covered with an opaque cup. The cup is then lifted and the 
ball is no longer where it was last seen, and the cup appears empty. 
Audiences delight in such displays and it seems natural to describe 
them as apparently anomalous or magical, and such appearances arise 
even for audience members who don’t believe that anything actually 
anomalous or magical occurred. Despite the belief that nothing out of 
the ordinary occurred, there is nonetheless a reliably generable 
appearance of something out of the ordinary: a ball visible in one 
location and then no longer being visible in that location without 
being seen to have been removed, and also without any visibly 
obvious means by which it may have been moved while unseen. The 
reliability with which magicians can elicit such responses from 
audience members, across wide varieties of audience member, makes 
it worth calling such inaccurate appearances illusions. 
Let us return now to the way our own conscious experiences seem 
to us. That a wide variety of people have conscious experiences 
(again, in the ‘weak’ and functional sense of conscious experience that 
the illusionist will grant) is not something I’m calling into question. 
Nor do I intend to raise any doubts about whether those conscious 
experiences appear to people in various ways. For example, when 
someone is in a position to answer the question of whether they saw, 
or instead felt, that a piece of metal is hot, I don’t mind chalking this 
up to the way their experience of the metal seemed to them. It seemed 
to them, for example, that they had a tactile experience as opposed to 
a visual experience of the metal’s hotness. But what I have doubts 
about is whether people unfamiliar with contemporary philosophy of 
mind introspect their conscious experiences and find them to seem-
ingly have properties that are anomalous or magical. Suppose one is 
seeing some expanse of green and also seems to oneself to be seeing 
an expanse of green. What anomalous or magical properties are 
apparently revealed to introspection? In the senses of ‘anomalous’ and 
‘magical’ that we would cash out in terms of being out of the ordinary 
or being contrary to the laws of nature, speaking for myself, my 
introspected experiences never appear that way. For example, when it 
seems to me that I’m having a visual experience of green, it doesn’t 
also seem to me that my experience has properties that violate the 
laws of nature. 
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Perhaps the apparent anomalousness or magicalness isn’t supposed 
by the illusionists to arise in ordinary episodes of introspection, but 
instead on occasions of reflection when one contemplates the sorts of 
topics connected to philosophical discussions of alleged explanatory 
gaps between conscious experiences and neuro-functional states. 
Perhaps the story is supposed to go like this: one attends to, say, a 
visual experience of a vivid electric blue, while also contemplating the 
brain processes that the experience is allegedly identical to or 
explainable in terms of, and it’s that — the alleged fact of the one 
arising out of, being identical to, or explainable in terms of the other 
— that seems magical or anomalous. But what’s the sense of 
‘magical’ or ‘anomalous’ at play here? It’s unlikely to be some con-
strual in terms of being out of the ordinary or contrary to the laws of 
nature. What we have here is the ordinary and lawful way in which 
visual experiences of vivid blue arise: they arise, ordinarily, in 
connection with the activities of human brains and probably also the 
activities in many of the brains of non-human animals. Further, and 
more to the point, it is not part of our introspective contents that such 
experiences don’t arise in this manner. Our experiences do not 
generally present themselves to introspection (as opposed to com-
paratively more complex episodes involving theoretically sophisti-
cated reflection) as the sorts of things that do not or cannot arise in 
virtue of neural processes. 
Of course, there are many in the philosophy of mind who have 
wondered how and why it is that experience so arises, and some 
philosophers have also been tempted towards the conclusion that no 
satisfying explanations of the how and the why can be given. But 
appreciating these philosophical questions and positions, and feeling 
any pull one way or another regarding them, seems to require far more 
philosophical sophistication than sits well with any apparent anoma-
lousness or magicalness being illusions properly so-called. 
Even if the problems I tried to pose in the present section turn out to 
not be genuine problems for Frankish’s illusionism, the problems 
raised in the previous section may still loom large. This is because the 
characterizations of phenomenal properties as anomalous or magical 
seem partial at best. It is unlikely that anyone who thinks that there is 
content to the phrase ‘phenomenal properties of experience’ will 
accept that a property of experience is phenomenal if and only if it is 
anomalous or magical. (I take similar remarks to apply to other 
characterizations of the phenomenal that Frankish employs, such as 
‘intrinsic’.) 
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3. Qualia quietism 
I have expressed doubts that anyone undergoes an illusion properly 
so-called that experiences instantiate phenomenal properties. Some of 
my doubts hinge on scepticism about any representations having 
‘phenomenal’ content. Other of my doubts hinge on reservations about 
what properly counts as an illusion. Given the latter sort of doubt, I’m 
reluctant to attribute to Frankish a meta-illusion — the illusion that 
anyone is undergoing the illusion of phenomenal properties. I’m 
likewise reluctant to embrace the label of meta-illusionism. More 
appealing to me is to recommend qualia quietism, which we may 
characterize as the view that the terms ‘qualia’, ‘phenomenal 
properties’, etc. lack sufficient content for anything informative to be 
said in either affirming or denying their existence. Affirming the 
existence of what? Denying the existence of what? Maintaining as 
illusory a representation of what? No comment. No comment. No 
comment. 
This is not to assert that the field of consciousness studies is pure 
folly. As Frankish stresses, there are plenty of clear uses of ‘con-
scious’, ‘experience’, and ‘conscious experience’, uses that can be 
explicated in ‘weak’ and functional ways. And there’s plenty of work 
already done and still being done on consciousness so-construed. But I 
see no future, illusionist or realist, for the term ‘qualia’ and its ilk.2 
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